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Trial Practice and Procedure
by Philip W. Savrin"

and
Robert W. Capobianco'"
I.

INTRODUCTION

This Article surveys the 1998 decisions of the Eleventh Circuit Court
of Appeals that have a significant impact on issues relating to trial
practice and procedure.
II.
A.

STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS

Entry of an Interlocutory Order Denying Class Certification

In Armstrong v. Martin Marietta Corp.,' the court had to decide
whether, in the absence of controlling authority, the statute of limitations begins to run immediately upon the district court's entry of an
interlocutory order denying class certification or whether the statute
remains tolled through final judgment in the former class action and
completion of an appeal from the order denying class certification.
Appellants in Armstrong were thirty-one former Martin Marietta
employees who were discharged between 1992 and 1993. Following their
terminations, twenty-eight of the appellants filed charges of age

* Partner in the firm of Freeman Mathis & Gary, LLP, Atlanta, Georgia. Clark
University (B.A., with high honors, 1981); Boston University (J.D., cum laude, 1985). Law
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Staff Attorney, United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, 1985-1988.
Member, American Bar Association, State Bar of Georgia, Atlanta Bar Association, Federal
Bar Association.
** Associate in the firm of Freeman Mathis & Gary, LLP, Atlanta, Georgia. Rutgers
University (B.A., with high honors, 1995); Emory University (J.D., 1998). Member, State
Bar of Georgia, Atlanta Bar Association.
1. 138 F.3d 1374 (11th Cir. 1998).
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discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
("EEOC"); three of the appellants did not file EEOC charges.2
Over time, the EEOC notified all twenty-eight appellants that their
charge of age discrimination was dismissed. Generally, receipt of notice
of dismissal triggers the ninety-day statute of limitations for bringing a
civil action. 3 However, the ninety-day period is tolled when the
potential plaintiff is a putative member of a class action.4 In this case,
twenty-eight of the appellants opted into Carmichaelv.Martin Marietta
Corp.,5 an age discrimination class action suit already proceeding in
Florida (the other three appellants were already named plaintiffs in
Carmichael). The court in Carmichael found that appellants were not
"similarly situated" to the other Carmichaelplaintiffs and, thus, certified
a class that did not include appellants.6 The court dismissed the claims
of appellants who were named plaintiffs and denied the remaining
appellants' requests to opt into the Carmichael class.7 Then, more than
ninety days after the court in Carmichael denied their requests to opt
into the class action, appellants filed their complaint!
Martin Marietta filed, and the district court later granted, a motion
for partial summary judgment on the ground that appellants failed to
file their individual lawsuits within ninety days after their dismissal
from the Carmichael class action. On appeal, appellants argued that the
statute of limitations should continue to be tolled, even after the court's
denial of class certification in Carmichael, "because the denial of
certification in an interlocutory order may be reversed by the district
court at any time before final judgment."9 After the court of appeals
reversed and remanded, a rehearing en banc was granted. °
The Age Discrimination in Employment Act's" statute of limitations
requires a plaintiff to file suit within ninety days of receiving the
2
EEOC's notice of dismissal of the plaintiff's discrimination charge.'
However, membership in a pending class action tolls the ninety-day
period.' 3 "The purpose of such tolling is to encourage class members

2.
3.
4.
5.

Id. at 1378-79.
Id. at 1379.
Id.
Carmichael v. Martin Marietta Corp., No. 93-434 (M.D. Fla. filed June 4, 1993).

6. Armstrong, 138 F.3d at 1379.

7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 1380-81.
10. Armstrong v. Martin Marietta Corp., 107 F.3d 830 (11th Cir. 1997).
11. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1994).
12. Id. § 626(e).

13. 138 F.3d at 1380.
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reasonably to rely on the class action to protect their rights." 4 The
Eleventh Circuit, in affirming the district court's grant of summary
judgment, stated that once the order denying class certification was
entered, "reliance on the named plaintiffs' prosecution of the matter
ceases to be reasonable, and ... excluded putative class members are
put on notice that they must act independently to protect their
rights." 5 Additionally, because a class certification decision is not a
"'final decision' within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291", it is not
appealable as a matter of right. 6 Waiting until the appellate process
is completed or until the time for taking an appeal has expired before
resuming the statute of limitations would take years and create
uncertainty. 7
Consequently, the district court's decision was affirmed.'"
B.

Equitable Tolling Under Truth in Lending Act

In Ellis v. General Motors Acceptance Corp.,19 appellants purchased
an automobile in May 1995. After allegedly discovering fraud fifteen
months after the purchase, appellants sued the financing company for
violations of the Truth in Lending Act ("TILA). 2 ° Appellants, recognizing that under TILA they only had one year from the time they
purchased the car to bring an action, argued that because they were
prevented from learning of the alleged misrepresentation, equitable
tolling should apply to suspend the statute of limitations.2 ' "[T]he
district court concluded that TILA [is] a jurisdictional statute and that
the [appellants'] claim was therefore time-barred."2 2
Appellants
contended that TILA was not a jurisdictional statute, but rather it was
a statute of limitations subject to equitable tolling." The issue of
whether TILA was subject to24equitable tolling was one of first impression in the Eleventh Circuit.
In its analysis, the court first began by noting that every other circuit
that considered the issue held that TILA was subject to equitable

14. Id.

15. Id.
16. Id. at 1385 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1994)).
17. Id. at 1389.

18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

Id. at 1394.
160 F.3d 703 (11th Cir. 1998).
15 U.S.C. § 1640(e) (1997).
160 F.3d at 705.
Id. at 706.
Id.
Id.
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tolling.25 "'Equitable tolling'" is the doctrine under which plaintiffs
may sue after the statutory time period has expired if they have been
prevented from doing so due to inequitable circumstances.2" Here, the
court noted that TILA is a consumer protection statute and, as such, is
remedial in nature and should be construed liberally.27 Because a
literal reading of the time limit within TILA would thwart its remedial
purpose, the court found that the statute of limitations in TILA is
subject to equitable tolling.2" To hold otherwise would reward those
perpetrators who are successful in concealing their fraudulent actions
long enough for the statute of limitations period to expire.2 9
C. RehabilitationAct and Title II of the Americans with Disabilities
Act ("ADA")
In Everett v. Cobb County School District,0 a plaintiff with multiple
sclerosis and bilateral SI joint dysfunction, while attending Kennesaw
State College to earn a degree in early childhood education, began her
student teaching assignment at Kennesaw Elementary School. The
teacher of the classroom to whom Everett was assigned made frequent
comments about Everett's disability and told Everett that she would
have to demonstrate that she was capable of teaching in any situation
to receive a satisfactory grade. On May 31, 1994, the Kennesaw State
faculty gave Everett a grade of incomplete and told her she would have
to repeat the student teaching program the following year. On June 6,
1994, Everett received a letter confirming that the May 31 decision
would stand. On June 6, 1996, Everett filed a complaint based on Title
II of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA")31 and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,32 alleging discrimination because of her disability.33
The district court granted defendants' motion to dismiss after it
reasoned that Georgia's two-year statute of limitations applied to all of
Everett's claims. 34 Everett appealed the district court's decision
"asserting that Georgia's two-year personal injury statute of limitations

25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 707.
Id.at 708.
Id.

30. 138 F.3d 1407 (11th Cir. 1998).
31.
32.
33.
34.

42 U.S.C. § 12111 (1994).
29 U.S.C. § 701 (1994).
138 F.3d at 1408.
Id.
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is inapplicable
to claims brought under the ADA and the Rehabilitation
35

Act."

Recognizing that the issue of the applicable statute of limitations
under Title II of the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 was an
issue of first impression for the Eleventh Circuit, the court stated that
when a federal statute does not contain a statute of limitations period,
courts should look to the most analogous state statute of limitations.3 "
Looking to the Supreme Court and other circuit courts for guidance on
the characterization of ADA or Rehabilitation Act claims, the court
concluded that, like most civil rights actions, discrimination actions are
claims to vindicate injuries to personal rights.37 Therefore, the
appropriate period is the state's statute of limitations for personal injury
actions."
Only the Fourth Circuit failed to apply the state personal injury
statute of limitations in a similar situation. 9 However, in that case
the Fourth Circuit held that because Virginia had passed a state
antidiscrimination statute that was identical to the federal Rehabilitation Act, the statute of limitations contained in that statute should be
applied as the most analogous.' Because Georgia had not passed a
state law identical to the Rehabilitation Act from which to borrow a
limitations period, the court decided to follow the lead of all the other
circuits and apply Georgia's two-year statute of limitations period for
personal injury actions to discrimination
claims brought under Title II
41
of the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act.
III.

A.

JURISDICTIONAL ISSUES

Res Judicataand Collateral Estoppel

1. Res Judicata. In Pleming v. Universal-Rundle Corp.,42 plaintiff
suffered a back injury while working for defendant. A year later she
applied for a clerical position with defendant that paid less than what
she was currently earning but would be less physically demanding.

35.
36.
37.
38.

39.
1993)).
40.
41.
42.

Id.
Id. at 1409.
Id.
Id.

Id. (citing Wolsky v. Medical College of Hampton Roads, 1 F.3d 222, 225 (4th Cir.
Id.
Id. at 1409-10.
142 F.3d 1354 (11th Cir. 1998).
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Although qualified for the position, plaintiff did not receive the job.
When plaintiff later filed an employment discrimination lawsuit against
the defendant alleging discrimination based on her race and disability,
the corporation explained it had a policy against allowing employees to
transfer to lower paying jobs. During the course of the litigation, two
additional clerical positions, similar to the types plaintiff originally
sought, opened at defendant corporation. Plaintiff never applied for
these positions and only learned of them during the course of discovery
nearly a year later. While plaintiff never amended her complaint to
include these incidents, she did describe them in her briefs before both
the magistrate judge and the district court. Plaintiff sought to use these
incidents as additional evidence that defendant's policy was a pretext for
discrimination and thus avoid summary judgment on her claims arising
out of the transfer decision. While later analyzing defendant's motion
for summary judgment, the magistrate judge made a reference to the
additional two clerical positions in which there were openings.'
After the district court granted summary judgment in favor of
defendant, plaintiff filed another complaint alleging discrimination and
retaliation against her in the company's decision to hire other applicants
for the two later clerical openings." Defendant moved to dismiss the
complaint on the ground that either res judicata or collateral estoppel
barred the suit because plaintiff had already litigated and lost on her
claims arising out of the later hiring decisions.4"
Res judicata, also known as claim preclusion, bars a subsequent claim
when a previous court "entered a final judgment on the merits of the
same cause of action in a prior lawsuit between the same parties."'
The court explained that "[r]es judicata acts as a bar 'not only to the
precise legal theory presented in the previous litigation, but to all legal
theories and claims arising out of the same operative nucleus of fact." 7
Therefore, the factual issues in dispute in the second suit must be
compared to the factual issues that were disputed in the first suit.'
Here, plaintiff filed her first lawsuit alleging discrimination in July of
1993. Plaintiff never learned about the later openings until May 1995.
Thus, these later openings were not in plaintiff's complaint, nor did she
seek to amend her complaint to include them.4 Citing the Eleventh

43. Id. at 1355-56.

44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

Id. at 1356.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1356-57 (quoting NAACP v. Hunt, 891 F.2d 1555 (11th Cir. 1990)).
Id. at 1357.
Id.
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Circuit's earlier decision in Manning v. City of Auburn,"° the court
stated that "for res judicata purposes, claims that 'could have been
brought' are claims in existence at the time the original complaint is
filed or claims actually asserted by supplemental pleadings or otherwise
in the earlier action."5' Recognizing that the events giving rise to
plaintiff's second lawsuit arose after her original lawsuit had been filed,
plaintiff was under no obligation to amend or supplement her original
complaint.5 2 The issue then became whether plaintiff's discussion of
the two additional openings in her brief amounted to an actual assertion
of that claim in the first proceeding. 53
In its analysis, the court referenced its earlier decision in Coon v.
Georgia Pacific Corp.5 4 In Georgia Pacific the issue was whether
plaintiff's references to unpleaded incidents of alleged discrimination in
her pretrial stipulation, motions before the court, and throughout the
course of discovery should be considered by the court.55 The Eleventh
Circuit affirmed the district court's refusal to consider those incidents
because plaintiff's references to the incidents by the aforementioned
methods were no substitute for the factual allegations of a complaint
required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8.56 Similarly, plaintiff's
references in Pleming to the earlier alleged incident of discrimination in
hiring were insufficient to put those claims before the district court
pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure because they were not
actually asserted in the prior litigation. 57 At most, the court stated,
"the report's reference to the post-1993 openings indicates that the
magistrate judge may have considered the events as evidence of pretext
but does nothing to suggest that the magistrate judge actually rendered
a decision about whether those events constituted independent or even
continuing acts of employment discrimination."" Therefore, the court
held that res judicata did not bar plaintiff's claims of discrimination
arising out of the later hiring decision.5"
2. Collateral Estoppel. The court in Pleming also had to decide
whether collateral estoppel-the doctrine which precludes the relitiga-

50.

953 F.2d 1355 (11th Cir. 1992).

51. 142 F.3d at 1357 (emphasis omitted).
52. Id.

53. Id.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

829 F.2d 1563 (11th Cir. 1987).
142 F.3d at 1358.
Id.
Id. at 1359.
Id.
Id.
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tion of an issue that has already been litigated and resolved in a prior
proceeding-would bar plaintiff's claims.'
In deciding whether the
issue had already been litigated, the court referred to a Seventh Circuit
case in which that court "explained that the actual litigation requirement for the application of collateral estoppel 'will usually be satisfied
merely by the designation of the question as one for trial... even if no
evidence is introduced ....

, 1k Additionally, in Wu v. Thomas, the

Eleventh Circuit found that a "judgment against the plaintiff on prior
claims of gender discrimination did not collaterally estop a subsequent
claim for retaliation, even though the testimony offered in the first trial
'touched on' the defendant's retaliatory actions." 2 Similarly, because
Pleming only offered the earlier incidents as evidence of pretext in a
distinct employment decision, she could not have been considered to have
actually litigated those claims." Offering those later incidents as
"evidence" is different than "actually litigating" the question of whether
those incidents would themselves constitute employment discrimination. 6' Therefore, the court held collateral estoppel also did not bar
plaintiff's claims.65
B.

Case or Controversy
Plaintiffs in Socialist Worker's Party v. Leahy,' were registered
minor political parties in Florida. A provision of Florida's election laws
required the chairs and treasurers of political parties to file certain
bonds. After receiving notification of this bond requirement, plaintiffs
filed suit alleging the bond requirements violated the First and
Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution.67
During the course of discovery, Florida's Secretary of State announced
that he had no authority to enforce the bonding requirements and had
no intention to apply the statute." Based upon this evidence, the
district court concluded that plaintiffs had failed to satisfy the "actual
case or controversy" requirement of Article III of the Constitution and

60. Id.
61. Id. (quoting Truck Ins. Exch. v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 951 F.2d 787, 792 (7th Cir.

1992)).
62. Id. at 1360 (citing Wu v. Thomas, 863 F.2d 1543, 1548-49 (11th Cir. 1989)).

63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

Id.
Id.
Id.
145 F.3d 1240 (11th Cir. 1998).
Id. at 1241-43.

68. Id. at 1243.
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thereby granted summary judgment in favor of defendants.6 9 While
plaintiffs moved for reconsideration, the Florida Division of Elections
sent plaintiffs another letter informing them they had failed to comply
with the bonding requirement. Agents of the Secretary of State advised
plaintiffs the letter had been sent in error, but never sent a letter
retracting the previous letter.7 ° The district court denied plaintiffs'
motion for reconsideration, "holding that the explicitly threatened harm
was not justiciable."71
The "case or controversy" requirement ensures that federal courts will
satisfy the justiciability doctrine by considering only those matters that
are presented in an adversarial context.72 When considering whether

an adversarial context exists when litigating a statute in a preenforcement context, the plaintiff must demonstrate "'a realistic danger
of sustaining direct injury as a result of the statute's operation or
enforcement.'"
The court determined that because the Secretary of State threatened
plaintiffs with future application of the bonding requirement and
because a credible threat of future enforcement still existed, the case or
controversy requirement of the Constitution was met.7 4 Two different
secretaries of state had tried on three separate occasions to apply the
bonding requirement to plaintiffs." Additionally, despite the Secretary's disavowal of authority to enforce the bonding requirement, a
threat of application still remained because the earlier letter had not
been retracted.7" These factors suggested the "very real probability
that a subsequent Secretary of State will also reach the same conclusion
and again attempt to apply the bonding requirement to [plaintiffs]."77

Therefore, there was a very realistic danger that the statute would be
enforced against plaintiffs in the future.7" Accordingly, the court found
that a live controversy did exist between plaintiffs and the Secretary of
State and thereby reversed the district court's finding.7 9

69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1244.
Id.
Id. at 1245 (citing ACLU v. The Florida Bar, 999 F.2d 1486, 1492 (11th Cir. 1993)).
Id.
Id. at 1246.
Id. (citing ACLU, 999 F.2d at 1492).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1247.
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IV. PREEMPTION

A.

Interstate Commerce Act

The issue before the Court in R. Mayer of Atlanta, Inc. v. City of
Atlanta,80 was a matter of first impression-whether the Interstate
Commerce Act"' preempts a municipal ordinance regulating the
provision of consensual towing services.8 2 Atlanta had a city ordinance
that required operators of tow trucks to obtain a license before operating
within the city limits.8 After the city council passed this ordinance,
Congress amended the Interstate Commerce Act to preempt a wide
range of state and local statutes and regulations governing interstate
motor carriage. In particular, the Act preempts state and local
regulation of prices, routes, and services provided by motor carriers that
transport property84 When Congress later passed the Interstate
Commerce Commission Termination Act, 5 it added a new exception to
the Interstate Commerce Act. With this new exception, the earlier
preemption of state and local regulation relating to motor vehicle
transportation by a tow truck would no longer apply "if such transportation is performed without the prior consent or authorization of the owner
or operator of the motor vehicle."88 Citations were issued to plaintiff
towing companies because they operated tow trucks within the city
limits without first obtaining the necessary permits. Plaintiff towing
companies argued that while the municipality may regulate the prices
charged for nonconsensual towing services, the regulation of consensual
towing services was still preempted.8"
After analyzing the language of the statute that made the statute
inapplicable to nonconsensual towing services, the court concluded that
"[i]f Congress had not intended for § 14501(c)(1) to preempt state and
local regulation of towing services generally, Congress would not have
included an express exemption that applies solely to the prices charged
for non-consensual towing services."8 8 The court went on to observe
that by including an express exemption for nonconsensual towing

80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

158 F.3d 538 (11th Cir. 1998).
49 U.S.C. §§ 13506, 14501 (Supp. II 1996).
158 F.3d at 540.
Id.
Id. at 541.
49 U.S.C. § 10501-10531 (1996).
Id. (citing 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(2)(C) (Supp. II 1996)).
Id.
Id. at 543.
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services, "Congress has evinced its intent that all aspects of consensual
towing services remain subject to the general rule set forth in the
preemption clause." 9 Thus, the court held that the Interstate Commerce Act preempted municipal ordinances relating to the price, route,
or provision of consensual towing services. °
B. FederalRailroad Safety Act
In Ingram v. CSX TransportationInc.,91 plaintiff filed a state law
negligence action after her automobile collided with a train at a railroad
crossing. The intersection at which the accident occurred had advance
warning devices, including no passing zone signs and crossbucks, but did
not have active warning devices such as flashing lights and gates.92
Congress enacted the Federal Railroad Safety Act9' to promote safety
in all areas of railroad operations.94 The Act contained an express
preemption clause which allowed states to adopt laws or regulations
relating to railroad safety until the Secretary of Transportation issued
a regulation or order pertaining to the subject matter of the state law or
regulation.95 Congress's later enactment of the Highway Safety Act of
1973' made federal funds available to states in order to improve grade
crossings. In return, the states had to "conduct and systematically
maintain a survey of all highways to identify those railroad crossings
which may require separation, relocation, or protective devices, and
establish and implement a schedule of projects for this purpose."97 The
Federal Highway Administration ("FHWA") promulgated regulations
placing conditions on the states' use of federal aid to improve grade
crossings. These laws required that "a grade crossing improvement
project either include an automatic gate or receive FHWA approval if
federal funds 'participate in the installation' of the warning devices.""
The issue in Ingram was whether these regulatory provisions preempted
plaintiff's state law negligence claim based on inadequate signals at the
crossing at which the accident occurred. 99

89. Id.

90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

Id. at 545.
146 F.3d 858 (11th Cir. 1998).
Id. at 860.
49 U.S.C. § 20101 (1994).
146 F.3d at 863.
Id.
23 U.S.C. § 101 (1994).
146 F.3d at 863 (quoting 23 U.S.C. § 130(d)).
Id.
Id. at 864.
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There is no question that federal funds participated in the installation
of the passive warning devices at the crossing at which the accident
occurred. " Indeed, the Fifth, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits have held
that such funding equates to federal approval of the warning devices
installed and, thus, triggers federal preemption of a plaintiff's state law
negligence claim based upon inadequate signals.'0 1 In their analysis,
these three circuits each found that federal funding indicates approval
of only passive, rather than active warning devices. 0 2
Despite these circuits' reasoning, plaintiff in Ingram argued that the
court should follow the Seventh Circuit's holding in Shots v. CSX
TransportationInc."°3 that mere federal financial participation in the
grade crossing upgrade project was not enough to trigger preemption
unless there was evidence that the federal government actually approved
of the specific warning devices installed."° Plaintiff argued that the
evidence she presented demonstrating that unsafe conditions existed at
the crossing at which the accident occurred required that active warning
devices be installed unless a government diagnostic team concluded that
active warning devices were not necessary.1°' Additionally, plaintiff
argued that because no determination was made about the appropriateness of passive warning devices at that location, the federal funding
allocated for the passive warning devices could not be viewed as federal
approval of the warning devices absent an inspection by federal
regulators.'0
The Eleventh Circuit rejected the Seventh Circuit's approach and
instead joined the Fifth, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits in holding that the
participation of federal funds in the grade crossing improvement project
triggers preemption of a plaintiff's inadequate signal claim.' 7 The
court reasoned that an express, specific administrative finding is not the
only way for the Secretary of Transportation to "approve" of the safety
devices installed at the crossing.'O The court concluded that such
approval could also be inferred and that the authorization of federal
funds to install the passive devices at the crossing was an example of

100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (citing 38 F.3d 304 (7th Cir. 1994)).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 865.
Id.
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such inferred approval."° Therefore, the court held that the Federal
Railroad Safety Act preempted plaintiff's state law negligence claim.'1 0
V. ABSTENTION
In both First Franklin Financial Corp. v. McCollum"' and TranSouth Financial Corp. v. Bell," 2 the respective plaintiffs filed fraudrelated claims against financial institutions in state court. Thereafter,
the defendants in the state court actions moved to compel arbitration in
dual filings in state and federal court. In both cases, the federal district
court abstained from exercising jurisdiction, even though the state court
had not yet issued a ruling on the arbitration issue." 3 And, in both
cases, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that the district courts' decisions
4
to abstain were abuses of discretion."
In analyzing whether the district courts should have abstained from
the financial institutions' motions to compel plaintiffs to proceed
pursuant to the arbitration clauses in the respective loan agreements,
the Eleventh Circuit stated that such abstentions must be reviewed
under the analysis set forth in two Supreme Court cases"5 -Moses H.
Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp."' and Colorado
River Water Conservation District v. United States."7 Reviewing the
factors in Moses H. Cone led the circuit court to decide that exercising
jurisdiction would not create piecemeal litigation." 8 First, the federal
proceeding could only have two outcomes: "an order compelling
arbitration or an order refusing to compel arbitration"." 9 Second, even
though the state court actions were filed prior to the federal court
petitions, there was no way the financial institutions could have known
prior to the time plaintiffs filed suit in state court that plaintiffs would
not honor the arbitration agreements. 20 Third, the law of decision2
weighed against abstention because the Federal Arbitration Act' '

109. Id.
110. Id.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

144 F.3d 1362 (11th Cir. 1998).
149 F.3d 1292 (11th Cir. 1998).
Id. at 1294; 144 F.3d at 1363.
149 F.3d at 1296; 144 F.3d at 1363.
149 F.3d at 1294.
460 U.S. 1 (1983).
424 U.S. 800 (1976).
149 F.3d at 1295.
144 F.3d at 1364; see also 149 F.3d at 1295.
144 F.3d at 1365; 149 F.3d at 1295.
9 U.S.C. §§ 3-4 (1994).
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governed motions to compel arbitration. 22 Additionally, any legal
interpretation would be of federal law. Finally, the court examined the
adequacy of the state courts to protect plaintiffs' rights.'"
While the court noted that state court remedies may be adequate, it
reasoned that factor alone does not warrant abstention. 1" The court
in First FranklinFinancialCorp. first noted the state court had not yet
ruled on the financial institution's petition to force plaintiff to arbitrate
the case, thereby undermining the federal policy, embodied in the
Federal Arbitration Act, in favor of swift enforcement of arbitration
agreements. 125 Second, the Moses H. Cone test permits abstention only
when some factor weighs heavily in favor of relinquishing jurisdiction;' 21 the financial institution obtaining relief at some point in the
future from the state court does not provide the justification needed to
refuse to exercise jurisdiction. Therefore,
both district courts abused
27
their discretion deciding to abstain.'
VI.

APPELLATE JURISDICTION

A.

Post-JudgmentMotions
In Harris v. Ballard,128 plaintiff filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 contesting the manner in which the state courts handled his
wrongful termination case. After the district court granted judgment in
favor of defendants and dismissed the case with prejudice, plaintiff filed
a motion for an extension of time to file a notice of appeal."
The
district court granted the motion (which was filed within the initial
appeal period) and thereby gave plaintiff thirty days from the date of the
order to file his notice. 30 Plaintiff filed his notice, but
not until
13
several days after the time extended by the district court. '
The Eleventh Circuit recognized that Federal Rule of Appellate
Procedure 4(a)(5) allows a district court discretion to extend the appeal
period, but only up to thirty days from the expiration of the initial
period.13 2 The court noted further that the district court's extension

122.
123.
124.

144 F.3d at 1365; 149 F.3d at 1295.
144 F.3d at 1365; 149 F.3d at 1295.
144 F.3d at 1365; 149 F.3d at 1295.

125.

Id.

126. Id.
127.

144 F.3d at 1365; 149 F.3d at 1296.

128. 158 F.3d 1164 (11th Cir. 1998).
129.
130.
131.
132.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

1164.
1166.
1165-66.
1166.
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in the case was within the time permitted by Rule 4(a)(5). 133 Because
plaintiff missed the extended deadline by a few days, however, the issue
to be resolved was whether plaintiff's motion to extend time to file his
notice of appeal could itself be considered as a notice of appeal."3' The
issue before the Eleventh Circuit was whether the motion for extension
of time, filed within thirty days after the expiration of the original period
and granted by the district court, was proper.135
In resolving this issue, the Eleventh Circuit acknowledged that
Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 3(c) provides that a notice of appeal
can be effective even if its form or title is informal, so long as the paper
filed indicates an intention to appeal. 3 ' In applying this standard, the
court had little hesitation in dismissing the appeal, stating simply that
"a motion for more time to appeal indicates uncertainty as to whether
the party will in fact appeal and compels the conclusion that the notice
of appeal is something yet to be filed."13 7 Thus, to treat a motion for
extension of time as the functional equivalent of a notice of appeal would
render the notice requirement meaningless.1 38 Accordingly,
the court
39
dismissed plaintiff's "appeal" for lack of jurisdiction.
B.

CollateralOrder Doctrine

In CSX Transportation Inc. v. Kissimmee Utility Authority,4 °
defendant ("KUA") entered into a contract with plaintiff ("CSX"). The
contract gave KUA the right to construct an access road across CSX's
railroad tracks to reach KUA's powerplant. The contract included an
indemnity provision whereby KUA assumed all liability and agreed to
defend and indemnify CSX for all damage at the crossing and all claims
and liability for any loss or damage at the crossing.' 4 '
After KUA constructed the crossing, a collision occurred. While a jury
in a separate suit determined that no fault was attributable to KUA, the
contract between KUA and CSX required KUA to indemnify CSX
regardless of the fault of KUA.'4 2 CSX sued KUA pursuant to this
indemnity provision and the district court ultimately granted CSX's
motion for partial summary judgment, thereby obligating KUA to

133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1167.
153 F.3d 1283 (11th Cir. 1998).
Id. at 1284.
Id.
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indemnify CSX.'" KUA filed an interlocutory appeal and the issue
before the Eleventh Circuit was whether the collateral order doctrine
conferred appellate jurisdiction.'"
Under the collateral order doctrine established in Cohen v. Beneficial
Industrial Loan Corp.,"' "the order appealed must conclusively
determine an important legal question, [and that] question [must be]
separate from the merits of the underlying action and not effectively
reviewable in an appeal from a final judgment in the underlying
action."'" KUA argued that both the denial of its motion for partial
summary judgment and the partial summary judgment granted in favor
of CSX were appealable because KUA is entitled to state sovereign
immunity. 4 7 In Mitchell v. Forsyth,'" the Supreme Court held that
a denial of summary judgment is immediately appealable when the
movant alleged a right to qualified immunity.149 "The Supreme Court's
decision in Mitchell was based on the observation that qualified
immunity... is immunity from suit or trial.. . "0 KUA argued that
Florida's state law of sovereign immunity is also immunity from suit,
and immunity would be lost if KUA was forced to litigate without the
protection of an immediate appeal of the denial of that immunity.1 5'
While the Eleventh Circuit agreed with KUA's argument that a denial
of immunity from suit was immediately appealable, it disagreed with
KUA's assessment of the law: under Florida law, sovereign immunity
was not immunity from suit, but was only immunity from liability.'52
Because the state is afforded sovereign immunity from liability only,
KUA's claim to sovereign immunity could be effectively reviewed after
completion of the litigation in the district court."
Accordingly, the
collateral order doctrine did not apply and KUA's appeal was dismissed.'" The significance of the decision, therefore, is that it directly
implies that in the proper case, the denial of immunity from suit, and
not just liability, would be appealable on an interlocatory basis to the
Eleventh Circuit for immediate review.
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Id. at 1285.
337 U.S. 541 (1949).
153 F.3d at 1285 (quoting Cohen, 337 U.S. at 545-46).
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472 U.S. 511 (1985).
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A.

Attorney Fees Under the ADEA
The issue in Turlington v. Atlanta Gas Light Co.'55 was one of first
impression in the Eleventh Circuit: under what circumstances may a
prevailing defendant obtain attorney fees in an Age Discrimination in
Employment Act ("ADEA")' 6 case. After granting summary judgment
to defendant employer, the district court granted defendant attorney fees
and costs.'57 While the ADEA does not have a provision regarding
attorney fees, it incorporates certain provisions of the Fair Labor
Standards Act ("FLSA"),'" including those pertaining to attorney
fees.' 59 While the FLSA also does not indicate under what circumstances the defendant should be awarded attorney fees, the Eleventh Circuit
has, on prior occasions, held that a prevailing defendant is entitled to
attorney fees under the FLSA only when the plaintiff litigated in bad
faith."6 Observing a close relationship between the ADEA and the
FLSA, the court of appeals held that attorney fees should be awarded to
a prevailing ADEA defendant
only upon a finding that the plaintiff
161
litigated in bad faith.
B.

Section 1981 Post-HiringRetaliation Claim
In another matter of first impression, the court had to decide in
Andrews v. Lakeshore RehabilitationHospital 2 whether an employer's
post-hiring retaliation claim was cognizable under section 1981.
Plaintiff sued her former employer for race discrimination and retaliation under section 1981."6 In Patterson v. McLean Credit Union,'
the Supreme Court held that the "make and enforce contracts"
language in section 1981 covered "only conduct at the initial formation
of the contract and conduct which impairs the right to enforce contract
obligations through legal process,"

. . .

and not "conduct which occurs

155. 135 F.3d 1428 (11th Cir. 1998).
156.
157.
158.

29 U.S.C. § 626 (1994).
135 F.3d at 1437.
29 U.S.C. § 216 (1994).

159. 135 F.3d at 1437.
160. Id.; See also Kreager v. Solomon & Flanagan, P.A., 775 F.2d 1541 (11th Cir. 1985).
161. 135 F.3d at 1437.
162. 140 F.3d 1405 (11th Cir. 1998).
163. Id. at 1406.
164. 491 U.S. 164 (1989).
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after the formation of a contract and which does not interfere with the
right to enforce established contract obligations."'
Following the Pattersondecision, Congress enacted the 1991 Civil Rights
Act'" and thereby amended section 1981 by giving "make and enforce
contracts" a broader definition. 167 Specifically, 42 U.S.C. § 1981(b) now
states that "'make and enforce contracts'" includes the "'making,
performance, modification, and termination of contracts, and the
enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, terms, and conditions of the
contractual relationship.'"'"
While retaliatory conduct occurring
before the effective date of the 1991 Act would not be cognizable under
section 1983, plaintiff in Andrews claimed that her employer retaliated
against her in 1994. The court held that a post-1991 retaliation claim
is cognizable under the amended section 1981 and, thus, plaintiff's
69
retaliation claim could proceed under that statute.
VIII. CONCLUSION
As in past years, this year's review of Eleventh Circuit cases adds new
rules to the federal landscape at both the trial and appellate levels.
There were quite a few issues of first impression as well. This Survey
will hopefully assist the bench and bar with the complexities of federal
court practice.
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